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The Importance of Forward Presence in the Pacific Theater - How  
Vital and Can CINCPAC Carry Out His Mission in the Near Future?

by

D. T. McBurney

CDR, SC, USN


A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in  
partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Operations  
Department.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and  
are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the  
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*D. T. McBurney*

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Abstract of  
THE IMPORTANCE OF FORWARD PRESENCE IN THE PACIFIC THEATER - HOW  
VITAL AND CAN CINCPAC CARRY OUT HIS MISSION IN THE NEAR FUTURE?

The National Security Strategy of the United States includes forward presence as one of the four cornerstones of American policy. Forward presence has been an element of our military policy since the turn of the century, especially in the Far East. However, as budgets become smaller and perceived costs of maintaining forward presence increases, the policy is being questioned as to whether there is value in its continuation. This study justifies continuing the policy of forward presence by highlighting American vital interests in the Far East and the Pacific, in general. It demonstrates that the Commander-in-Chief Pacific has sufficient forces and options to show American resolve in maintaining balance of power and regional stability among the many potential adversaries for the next few years.

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# The Importance of Forward Presence in the Pacific Theater - How Vital and Can CINCPAC Carry Out His Mission in the Near Future?

## Chapter 1

### Introduction

As the risk of global conflict recedes with the disintegration of the former USSR, America's need for engagement in distant corners of the world comes into question. The policy of containment which had evolved over the past forty years has become obsolete. The balance of power in the Western Pacific changes every day. The growing military power of China, the increasing interest of a militarily expanding India, a growing Japanese Self Defense Force, a retrenching Soviet military and a decreasingly smaller American military presence are only a few of the changes taking place.

This newly evolving multi-polar world causes many to believe that the United States should pull back from its commitments throughout the world, in a sense returning to America's pre-World War II policy of isolationism. It reflects a growing multi-polar world in which no one has operated since World War I and certainly not since World War II.

In view of the above, how do these new perceptions and realities alter the ability of the United States Commander-in-Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) to carry out his responsibilities? What are the United States' vital interests in his area of responsibility (AOB)? How has the changing world affected the

views of our allies and potential adversaries is his AOR? What are their capabilities? Will he be able to deter aggression, maintain the balance of power, and protect the United States' vital interests in the immediate future with the assets he has? What are some of the operational tools he has at his disposal and what changes can be made to improve his chances for success? This paper will look at these questions and provide a brief analysis of a very complex and interesting subject about which numerous books have been written. It is intended to focus on a peacetime environment.

Chapter II will address the importance of the Far East and the Pacific to the United States looking at economic, cultural, military ties and sea lines of communication (SLOC). Chapter III will look at a few of the risks and threats in the theater. Chapter IV will briefly discuss the evolution of American national and military policy from forward basing to forward presence. Chapter V will identify the capabilities CINCPAC has available to him and ways to utilize them. Finally, Chapter VI will provide a summary and conclusion.

## Chapter 11

### American Interests in the Pacific AOR

The foundation of national security rests on America's national interests. They include favorable world order, promotion of values, defense of the homeland, and economic well being. The regional Commanders-in-Chief are involved in all four areas primarily at the strategic level but frequently at the operational level.

The question of what are America's vital interest in CINCPAC's AOR is crucial to understanding why the United States should not withdraw from the area. It is crucial that CINCPAC understands why the United States is engaged in the area in order that he may better carry out his duties in a peacetime environment.

Economic. In 1984, trans Pacific trade for the first time exceeded trans Atlantic trade and has continued to grow.<sup>1</sup> The economic interdependence of the American economy with all other Pacific AOR trading partners and their own interdependence on each other is currently the single most vital interest in CINCPAC's AOR. Maintaining stability is essential for America's economic well being.

Table 2-1 lists America's foreign trade with leading Pacific AOR countries for 1990. It highlights the fact that the United States' gross trade with Pacific AOR nations exceeds that of Europe by 92 billion dollars.<sup>2</sup> The fact that there is a deficit



Table 2-1

U.S. Foreign Trade with Leading Countries, 1990<sup>3</sup>  
(millions of U.S. dollars)

	Exports	Imports	Balance
Western Europe <sup>4</sup>	112,136.2	108,021.9	4,114.3
Pacific AOR	118,675.6	193,263.1	(74,587.5)
Asia			
Japan	48,584.6	89,655.2	(41,070.5)
PRC (China)	4,807.3	15,223.9	(10,416.6)
ROK (South Korea)	14,398.7	18,493.2	(4,094.4)
ROC (Taiwan)	11,482.4	22,666.7	(11,184.3)
Hong Kong	6,840.4	9,488.0	(2,647.6)
South Asia			
India	2,486.2	3,191.2	(705.0)
Pakistan	1,142.9	609.0	534.0
Bangladesh	181.5	535.4	(353.8)
Sri Lanka	137.3	538.4	(401.1)
Southeast Asia			
Thailand	2,991.5	5,293.8	(2,302.3)
Cambodia	0.0	0.1	(0.1)
Malaysia	3,424.7	5,272.3	(1,847.6)
Singapore	8,019.1	9,839.5	(1,820.4)
Indonesia	1,896.7	3,343.1	(1,446.4)
Brunei	142.7	95.7	47.0
Philippines	2,471.5	3,382.6	(911.0)
South Pacific			
Australia	8,534.7	4,432.7	4,102.0
New Zealand	1,133.3	1,199.4	(66.1)

with Pacific AOR countries does not detract from the importance of the trade. Furthermore Table 2-2 and Table 2-3 clearly demonstrate the international flow of capital. Table 2-2 identifies Japan as the largest foreign investor in the United States with approximately 27 percent of the total foreign investment. At times Japanese and other foreign investors have been major buyers of U.S. treasury securities, purchasing as much as 40 percent of the notes and bonds sold at Government auctions.<sup>5</sup> This is significant in that it helps bridge the investment gap between what is needed in America and what is

available domestically. Table 2-3 shows United States direct Investment in selected countries. Clearly, the United States is not as significantly invested in Asia as Asia is in the United States. United States capital continues to prefer Europe to Asia but that does not reduce the importance of Asia to American economic interests.

Table 2-2

Foreign Direct Investment in the U.S.<sup>6</sup>  
(billions of U.S. dollars)

	1970	1980	1990
All Countries	13.2	83.0	403.7
Japan	0.2	4.7	108.1
Netherlands	2.1	19.1	83.5
Switzerland	1.5	5.0	64.3
Germany	0.7	7.5	27.8
Canada	3.1	12.1	27.7
United Kingdom	4.1	14.1	17.5

Table 2-3

U.S. Direct Investment Abroad in Selected Countries  
(millions of U.S. dollars)

	1986 <sup>7</sup>	1988 <sup>8</sup>	1990 <sup>9</sup>
All Countries	259.6	326.9	421.5
Western Europe <sup>10</sup>	98.5	126.5	203.6
Asia			
Japan	11.3	16.9	21.0
ROK (South Korea)	0.8	1.3	2.1
ROC (Taiwan)	0.9	1.5	2.3
Hong Kong	4.0	5.0	6.5
South Asia			
India	0.4	0.5	0.6
Southeast Asia			
Thailand	1.1	1.1	1.5
Malaysia	1.1	1.4	1.4
Singapore	2.2	3.0	4.0
Indonesia	4.4	3.0	3.8
Philippines	1.1	0.3	1.7
South Pacific			
Australia	9.1	13.1	14.5

Table 2-4 provides a brief review of the economic performance of several countries since 1968. Looking at the Pacific AOR countries overall, it is obvious that they have outperformed both the United States and the European Community. There is little reason to expect this trend not to continue, albeit at a lesser rate as the newly industrialized countries slowly shift their economies to more sophisticated products and as labor rates rise.

Table 2-4

Gross Domestic Product <sup>11</sup>  
(Average Annual Growth in %)

	1968	1978	1988
United States	4.1	5.2	4.4
European Community	5.2	3.1	3.8
Asia			
Japan	12.9	5.1	5.7
PRC (China)	-6.5	12.5	11.2
ROK (South Korea)	10.6	10.9	11.3
South Asia			
India	3.6	5.8	10.0
Pakistan	7.2	8.1	7.1
Southeast Asia			
Thailand	8.5	10.5	10.9
Malaysia	8.0	6.8	8.9
Indonesia	13.9	7.7	5.5
Philippines	5.5	5.5	6.5

Finally, Table 2-5 provides a comparison of the gross size of several selected economies and the corresponding per capita income. Utilizing the growth rates (1968) from the countries listed in Table 2-4 as an example, and applying them to the economies listed in Table 2-5, it is logical to expect that the foreign trade listed in Table 2-1 will increase in the future, barring unforeseen world economic collapse.

Table 2-5

Relative Size of Economies<sup>12</sup>

	Gross National Product-GNP <sup>13</sup> (U.S. \$ in billions) (year)	GNP per capita (U.S. \$) (year)
United States	5,465.1 (1990)	20,903 (1989) <sup>14</sup>
Pacific AOR	3,456.7 (na) <sup>15</sup>	(na) <sup>16</sup>
Asia		
Japan	1,800.0 (1989)	15,030 (1989)
PRC (China)	393.0 (1989)	360 (1989)
ROK (South Korea)	171.0 (1988)	2,186 (1986)
ROC (Taiwan)	150.2 (1989)	7,510 (1989)
Hong Kong <sup>17</sup>	54.5 (1988)	9,580 (1988)
South Asia		
India	287.0 (1989)	350 (1989)
Pakistan	40.0 (1989)	370 (1989)
Bangladesh	20.2 (1989)	180 (1989)
Sri Lanka	7.2 (1989)	430 (1989)
Southeast Asia		
Thailand	64.4 (1989)	1,170 (1989)
Malaysia	37.0 (1989)	2,130 (1989)
Singapore	24.0 (1989)	8,782 (1988)
Indonesia	87.9 (1989)	435 (1988)
Brunei	3.1 (1987)	20,000 (1987)
Philippines	38.2 (1988)	667 (1988)
South Pacific		
Australia	240.0 (1989)	14,440 (1989)
New Zealand	39.0 (1989)	11,040 (1989)

Cultural. Although the importance of cultural ties to the Pacific AOR are not obvious, CINCPAC should be aware that the Asian population in the United States grew by 70 percent in the 1980's.<sup>18</sup> Table 2-6 provides a breakdown of American racial changes in the population. The Asian representation of 2.9 percent found in Table 2-6 is a significant increase over the 1980 census percentage of 1.5.<sup>19</sup> Table 2-7 provides a summary of immigration by area. The thirty year trends supports the ever increasing Asian migration to America.

Table 2-6

American Demographics <sup>20</sup>

	Total Race Representation Population Percent (in millions)		Racial Growth in the United States from 1980 to 1990 Percent
Total	249.6	100.0	9.8
Asian	7.3	2.9	107.8
Hispanic	22.4	9.0	53.0
Indian	2.0	0.8	37.9
Black	30.0	12.0	13.2
White	178.1	71.4	6.0
Other <sup>21</sup>	9.8	3.9	45.1

Table 2-7 <sup>22</sup>Immigration by Country of Birth  
(in percent unless otherwise indicated)

	1961-1970	1971-1980	1981-1988	1989
All Countries (pop.)	3,371,700	4,493,300	4,710,700	1,090,000
Asia	11.8	32.4	41.1	25.0
Europe	37.3	17.8	10.8	7.6
North America	40.6	36.6	33.1	55.7
South America	6.9	6.3	6.6	5.4
Africa	1.2	2.0	2.8	2.3
Other Countries	2.2	4.9	5.6	4.0

Since the new immigrants have tended to cluster in towns or cities where a friend or relative first settled<sup>23</sup>, their political representation can be expected to be increased following the redistricting resulting from the 1990 census. What this means to CINCPAC is that during a crisis in a particular country, there may be American domestic political ramifications. As the senior military officer in the area, he may be required to implement a change in foreign policy and more importantly he may be involved in developing a solution to the crisis in coordination with knowledgeable and concerned politicians in

addition to the normal chain of command and interdepartmental relationships.

Military Contact. The United States has six formal security agreements in effect in the Pacific AOR. They are the 1950 United States-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty<sup>24</sup>, the 1952 Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS) (the United States has suspended its security obligations to New Zealand), the 1952 United States-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty, the 1954 United States-Republic of Korea Mutual Defense Treaty, and finally the 1954 Manila Pact which are bilateral agreements with Thailand and the Philippines. These treaties and agreements often manifest themselves in the form of exercises such as Team Spirit, Cobra Gold, and RIMPAC. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)<sup>25</sup>, with the exception of Brunei, maintain major United States weapon systems in inventory and members of their security institutions receive training in the United States. Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines engage in episodic joint training exercises with the United States military.<sup>26</sup> Of course there are numerous lesser bilateral agreements that reflect a nations desire to be involved with the United States yet not be seen as being an American surrogate as was the case in the Philippines where many viewed their relationship with the United States as colonial.

Within the last year, the United States has signed a bilateral agreement with Singapore. It provides for the use of a former British base allowing the transfer of some commands and

activities located in the Philippines to Singapore.

Additionally, Malaysia has agreed to some ship repair work to be accomplished in Lumet, Malaysia.<sup>27</sup> For CINPAC, this is very important in that the loss of the naval base at Subic Bay has caused a degradation of the Navy's ability to easily maintain a forward presence in Southeast Asia. The dispersal of the many commands and capabilities located at Subic Bay cannot be replaced in some cases. Most notably in the area of logistics and to a lesser degree, in the maintenance and training capabilities. These losses do not mean that U.S. Naval and Air Forces will not be able to carry out their many missions including forward presence or crisis response but it does mean that alternative options have to be developed, such as alternative locations or means to accomplish logistics, maintenance, and other support functions.

CINCPAC and his subordinate Air Force Commander, PACAF, also had to deal with alternatives to the use of Clark Air Base even though they were scaling back before Mount Pinatubo erupted. The loss of Clark Air Base was not as serious as the loss of Subic Bay, however if the Air Force had been forced to withdraw during the Vietnam War, it would have impacted far more severely.

The point of discussing the withdrawal from the Philippines is that it highlights the importance of good relations with other nations which may help resolve future operational shortfalls created by unexpected changes in strategic relationships. CINCPAC is continually trying to build positive relations with

other countries in order to enhance the United States' potential ability to gain access to needed support when required. The relationships he develops with other military and state leaders of countries within his AOR may be useful in future crisis' or conflicts. This must be considered one of his most important jobs during peacetime.

Sea Lines of Communication. The waters of Southeast Asia occupy a crossroads position between the Indian and Pacific oceans on the trade routes of Europe, Africa, the Middle East, Japan and other Far Eastern nations.<sup>28</sup> The shortest of the routes go through the Malacca and Singapore straits and on through the South China Sea. Seventy-two percent of the eastbound traffic goes through these straits. However the Lombok Strait, the Makassar Strait, and the Celebres Sea south of Mindanao is used by the largest tankers when they are fully loaded going from the Mideast to Japan or other northern destinations including the United States, or when they have any heavy cargo such as ore. This route only takes twenty-eight percent of the traffic however it represents forty-eight percent of the deadweight tonnage.<sup>29</sup> The map shown on the next page provides a visual impression of the trade routes described above. It is obvious that there are numerous places where shipping could be stopped by military means or hijacked by pirates as has been happening since men have sailed those seas. These straits are vital to the United States and its allies because of the trade that passes through them.





# TANKER TRAFFIC: SHIP MOVEMENTS, ALL SIZES (1980)

NUMBER OF TANKERS



COMMERCIAL PORTS

VERY SMALL  
SMALL  
MEDIUM  
LARGE



## Chapter III

### Risks and Threats in the Pacific AOR

The risks of conflict revolve around the three largest and most powerful countries in the Pacific AOR, in addition to one dangerous totalitarian government. The three largest are serious contenders for regional hegemony due to their economic or military strength. These countries are China (Peoples Republic of China or PRC), India, and Japan. Each of these countries has the potential for indigenous military power projection and for the assertion of their national interests.<sup>1</sup> The totalitarian government is North Korea (Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea or DPRK).

Threats related to China are serious and volatile. There is potential, at any moment, for a Sino-India conflict resulting from disagreements concerning their common border and over historical, cultural, and racial issues. China has been and is currently in disagreement with most of its neighbors concerning their borders or disputed islands. India's primary perceived enemy is China as discussed above, however their border dispute with Pakistan is also a potential danger on a daily basis with the risk of drawing China and other countries into a conflict. Finally, in the short term, the Japanese do not expect any conflict with China, India, or any of its neighbors. In the long term, however, they do not trust Chinese regional ambitions. Additionally, the Japanese perceive no threat from India with the

exception of possible competition in Southeast Asia which could lead to freedom of seas issues. Japanese strategic concerns are minimal if and only if the United States remains engaged in the area.

China. The People's Republic of China (PRC) is not only a nuclear power but is also a conventional power capable of projecting force beyond its coastal borders. It has developed a limited blue water naval capability including a small amphibious force that could be used to exert its dominance in the region as it did in 1974 when it seized the Paracel Islands from South Vietnam. The Spratlys are the most visible example in which their growing military helps enforce their territorial claim to an area and threaten its neighbors. The PRC's attitude of interference in Hong Kong's economy even before they assume control in 1997 bodes poorly in relation to the policy of one China - two systems as it relates to the eventual reunification of Taiwan (ROC) with mainland China (PRC). Another complicating factor is if the Taiwanese economy manages to maintain its strong economy and per capita income as shown in Table 2-5, it will make the task of political unification progressively more difficult. Tienamen Square has also reinforced doubts about the PRC's potential for being a peaceful ally for any of the nations of the area. Although the government professes no ambition for territorial expansion, its actions indicate otherwise. In 1988, the PRC had a military clash with Vietnam and the most recent example is a law made public on February 26, 1992 stating that

the Senakaku Islands, known as the Diaoyutai Archipelago in Chinese, are its indigenous territory and that the Chinese military has the right to remove by force any incursion on the islands and surrounding territorial waters.<sup>2</sup> These are islands claimed by the PRC, the ROC, and Japan. This new law also applies to the Spratlys which is claimed by PRC, ROC, Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines.<sup>3</sup> Additionally, China is a force to be recognized just because of its size and population. The fact that it does have valid natural security interests in the area adds to the region's potential instability.

India. As a relatively new nation, India did not start out with maritime goals. However, in the last two decades, it has significantly improved its naval forces to the extent that it has a limited offensive blue water capability, including a small amphibious capability. In the last decade, it has shown the willingness to use military power as illustrated by its involvement in the Maldives coup and the introduction of Indian troops in Sri Lanka. The concerns being voiced by its small neighbors to the east are what are its goals and interests in Southeast Asia. Its diplomatic effort to help solve the civil war in Cambodia are welcomed on one hand and viewed with suspicion on the other. It appears that India's new found military power may encourage it to attempt to fill what it perceives as a power vacuum in the Southeast Asia region as a result of the American withdrawal from the Philippines and the overall announced American force reductions. The fact that it

belongs to the nuclear club is even more unsettling when one looks at potential competition with China. In this regard, its dispute with Pakistan, although dangerous, is really only a side show compared to its long historical distrust of the Chinese to the north.

Japan. Today, Japan is an economic superpower influencing the region with its economic might. Its best and most constructive contribution to the balance of power in the region is through economic aid and the development of economic interdependence with its neighbors. Japan's regional interest revolve around issues such as the fact that Southeast Asia is a major source of essential raw materials, a sizeable market for their manufactured goods, the site of substantial Japanese investment and most importantly, that sixty percent of Japan's oil imports and forty percent of its foreign trade are transported via the Straits of Malacca and the Lombok Straits.<sup>4</sup>

Militarily, Japan has reluctantly taken on greater responsibility in the sharing of security costs for the Western Pacific. The United States has pushed Japan to increase its military expenditures and overall role in the area including the responsibility of a 1000 mile security zone around its own territory. Even though Japan's expenditure on the military is only one percent of their GNP, it is larger than the entire Indonesian budget.<sup>5</sup> The encouraged buildup of Japan's military is viewed with concern. Even the Diet's potential discussion of sending 100 non-combatant troops to the Middle East during Desert

Storm caused not only internal turmoil, it scared many of its neighbors who have not forgotten World War II. Currently, Japan's political and military power is small compared to what it could be if their economy was harnessed to increasing their military might. Fear of Japan's remilitarization could be limited if spending is kept below the one percent figure, their intentions are explained to their neighbors and the United States remains physically in the area. Democracy's strength and the Japanese's view of themselves is significantly different than it was in the 1930's and any comparison would be viewed by the Japanese as heresy. Some would say that they have effectively accomplished economically what they could not do militarily in World War II but conditions do change.

North Korea. Military tensions are a source of instability on the Korean Peninsula. There are numerous problems aggravating the North-South relationship. They include the impending transition of power from Kim Il-sung to his son Kim Jong-il, the end of Soviet subsidies and the general chaos found in the economy, and the demise of most communist governments which have supported North Korea in the past.<sup>6</sup>

North Korea is feeling the strains of growing international diplomatic and ideological isolation. Their apparent attempt to develop nuclear weapons is also complicating the attempt of better relations with South Korea. There is a great fear that North Korea may attempt a desperate military action against South Korea in the very near future as a result of their own internal

problems and the belief that they may never have as good of chance as they do now. They have a strong military and are a weapons exporter. They are known to have recently improved their indigenously produced Soviet-designed SCUD-B missile with a estimated range of 310 miles-sufficient to strike at targets throughout South Korea.<sup>7</sup>

Russia. An appraisal of the Pacific AOR would not be complete without mentioning the former Soviet Union. The Russian Navy is an extremely viable threat in numbers and capability but as events in the world over the past two years have evolved, their intent to threaten anyone has dissipated. The withdrawal from Vietnam's Cam Ranh Bay and decreased deployments are concrete action that indicate they are occupied with internal problems and it is unlikely they will be involved in any confrontations that are not on their own borders anytime soon. They are a blue water navy staying mainly in their own brown water.

ASEAN. The relative weakness of the ASEAN States make them dependent on American and Western Security guarantees. Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei and even the Philippines do not want the United States to leave the area. Australia, which is always concerned about its neighbors to the north, is concerned about a potential power vacuum and balance of power struggle if the United States abandons the policy of forward presence.<sup>8</sup> Territorial disputes and mutual suspicions based on ethnic, religious and historical factors are a major concern of each country. It is their feeling that the presence

of a great power like the United States should be encouraged, as long as possible, to stay in the region as it provides a useful buffer among 'friends' and, consequently, a sense of security.<sup>9</sup>



## Chapter IV

### American Policy Evolution

The military strategy evolution of forward basing to forward presence must be reviewed in the context of the underlying origins of American foreign policy over the last forty-five years. In 1947, George F Kennan, a senior state department foreign policy expert, wrote an article under the pseudonym of X promoting a 'perimeter' defense. He spoke of the need 'to confront the Russians with unalterable counterforce where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world'<sup>1</sup>. Although this was not official policy, or even Kennan's view a short time later, it is useful in showing American attitudes toward communism and its biggest advocate, the Soviet Union. Additionally, the Truman Doctrine suggested something approaching an obligation to aid victims of aggression everywhere<sup>2</sup>. In 1950, NSC-68 was written formalizing American policy in a single, comprehensive statement of interests, threats, and feasible responses. One of the major policies to be stated was that of containment - that all points along the perimeter of Eurasia were considered of equal importance.

Although it is acknowledged that the United States could not carry out this policy due to lack of resources, a military strategy had to be developed which could be used to implement it, when and if resources were obtained. The majority of resources available were intended for Western Europe as that was the center

of attention. One of the military strategy cornerstones developed to implement containment was forward basing and since there was a great fear of the Soviets attacking in Europe, forward bases were established and reinforced throughout Europe to deter that aggression. This meant placing significant numbers of men and material face to face with the potential likely aggressor.

That type of direct confrontation was not expected in the Pacific AOR because of the same reasons discussed above. The massive Soviet divisions were facing west and there was not a significant perceived threat in the Soviet Far East. When the Communist Chinese took over mainland China and the North Koreans attempted to take over the Korean Peninsula, these developments reinforced American fears of a communist conspiracy for global hegemony.

American policy implementation of containment in the Pacific AOR, however, was never the same as it was in Europe, primarily because of geographic and geopolitical conditions. The Soviets were not face to face with the United States or any of our allies on a land mass. Japan was being reformed in the image of America and an occupation force was there to see that this process continued smoothly, at least initially in the late forties and early fifties. Regional balance of power relationships were being maintained by an American presence throughout the region using limited bases, as compared with the number and size of their counterparts in Europe--the one exception being in South

Korea where, as in Europe, American and other western nations stand face to face with communists.

Our policy of containment in the Pacific AOR was based on regional balance of power and in attempting to deter would be Soviet communist surrogates from attacking their neighbors. We attempted to prevent a domino effect by our presence. Even in the case of Vietnam, the United States did not have forward bases there, as a long term policy, such as was the case in Europe. Furthermore, although the United States lost Vietnam tactically, there are some today who say that America's strategic presence in the area has in fact prevented further communist domination of other countries in Southeast Asia and the Pacific in general.

In summary, though the national strategic policy of "containment" has changed to something like "stability", little has changed as it applies to the military missions in the Pacific AOR since the late forties. The missions have not changed due to the demise of the Soviet Union and with the obsolescence of the containment policy because the threats of some ideological communists and totalitarian states have not disappeared as they have in Europe. The words have changed from forward basing to forward presence, but CINCPAC's basic missions of maintaining the balance of power and providing regional stability and deterrence (conventional) throughout his AOR have not changed. These missions are valid in their own right and already tailored to a regional orientation. CINCPAC never had the infrastructure (bases) that was present in Europe and the threat was never

American versus Soviet on the ground. The significant withdrawal of ground troops and material from CINCEUR's AOR is unique to that area and can not be duplicated in CINPAC's AOR because the military strategy of containment was applied differently and conditions allowing for a European withdrawal are not the same as in the Pacific.

## Chapter V

### Ways and Means to Carry Out CINCPAC's Mission

CINCPAC's means to accomplish his mission are changing slowly and will continue to change as his force structure levels out in the mid 1990's. This does not mean that he will be unable to carry out his mission of maintaining the balance of power and promoting stability throughout his AOR. It does mean that he will have to rely on less numbers of men and equipment (ships, planes, and tanks) to demonstrate presence and it will require an understanding of how to offset the potential negative psychological impact of American military reductions on the attitudes of other countries.

In 1995, CINCPAC will have the same service component and subordinate unified commands as he has today. The United States Army will have the 25th Infantry Division (Light) located in Hawaii, the 45th Support Group in Hawaii, and the United States Chemical Activity on Johnston Island. The United States Pacific Fleet will have the Seventh Fleet based in Yokosuka, Japan, the Third Fleet located in San Diego, California, and Fleet Marine Force, Pacific headquartered in Hawaii. The Pacific Air Forces will consist of the 5th Air Force in Japan, the 7th Air Force in Korea, the 11th Air Force in Alaska and the 13th Air Force in Okinawa. The subordinate unified commands will be United States Forces Japan located at Yokota Air Base in Japan, United States Forces Korea located in Seoul, South Korea, the Special

Operations Command Pacific located in Hawaii and the Alaska Command at Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska. Finally, CINCPAC should continue to have Joint Task Force Five in Alameda, California.<sup>1</sup>

The fact that CINCPAC will have the same command structure without the same forces requires innovative and different uses of all assets and capabilities. Options include using different sized carrier battle groups (CVBGs), surface action groups (SAGs) vice CVBGs, amphibious task forces/groups (ATF/G) vice CVBGs, individual ship port visits vice entire battle groups, military to military and government to government contacts emphasizing nation building, security assistance, and combined military exercises and training, humanitarian relief, and possible integration of allied navies into American battle groups.

CINCPAC's Options. In the past, the United States Navy had planned for a worst case large scale attack by the former Soviet Union against a CVBG. Therefore, the CVBG had as many as twelve escort and support vessels in company. With the decrease of the Soviet threat, the make up of the CVBG can be cut by as least six vessels. Amphibious task forces/groups should be utilized just like a CVBG as far as projecting power and showing presence. In fact, they are more effective when the Marines can exercise ashore in a combined or joint exercise. Although the mothballing of the battleships has reduced the impressiveness of a SAG, it still can be used to project power and presence with the substitution of an Aegis cruiser.

Integration of allied navies into American battle groups, similar to the NATO squadron in the Atlantic, should be tried. This might ease the Navy's optempo problem and more importantly, make the augmenting nations feel more integrated into their own regional security.

Battle groups and surface groups have tended to make port visits to a country as a group. For the immediate future and beyond, ships should make port visits as individual units more frequently and CINCPAC should promote them as goodwill gestures. The Navy and the military in general have sometimes not emphasized routine visits of American forces as such.

In reviewing many news magazines, it is clear that CINCPAC and other senior officers make contact with the leaders of the many nations in the Pacific AOR as well as their military counterparts. This is essential in ensuring better relations with those countries. Additionally, contact between senior civilians such as Secretary Cheney, Baker, and other senior governmental figures help reassure those in the area that the United States is and will continue to be engaged in the Pacific in the future. The importance of these high visibility contacts can not be underemphasized in there effect on how others view America's commitment and in turn how they see their own security needs. The constant contact allows for coordination of many issues from nation building and security assistance to combined military exercises and training. Coordination by all component commanders with their allied opposites should be promoted with

the benefit being that when a crisis occurs, there is mutual understanding of interoperability and trust, as demonstrated during the recent Mideast crisis. In the past, this has been important to all CINC's but it must be emphasized even more now that the United States may have to rely on others for assistance in resolving regional issues. Unilateral action may not be possible.

Humanitarian efforts promote goodwill for the United States and help show our concern and interest in the area. When possible and appropriate, actions such as the relief efforts conducted in Bangladesh, the Philippines and northern Iraq in 1991 should be done. Activating the Navy's hospital ship for a tour of the area as was done in 1987 would generate great goodwill and demonstrate America's humanitarian concern for Third World countries. As with all operations involving foreign countries from humanitarian to nation building, close coordination with the appropriate American ambassador and his country team is a requirement for a successful operation.

None of the above options are beyond the capabilities of CINCPAC to implement. They may require closer coordination and planning within our own governmental agencies and with the other nations in the Pacific AOR but they do not require additional resources or even the resources available today. Maintaining the balance of power and promoting regional stability can be accomplished by America's forward presence and engagement in the area.



Psychological Concerns. The reduction of troops and airmen in South Korea and Japan and the total withdrawal of airmen and sailors from the Philippines are potential indicators to our friends and enemies alike that we do not have a vital interest in the region. Our debates domestically concerning what level of military we should have are watched with delight and dismay by those same parties. Our economic interests are visible but does not prevent anyone in the area from considering what new security problems may occur if the United States withdraws its military presence.

Even though there are valid reasons why the United States is lessening its presence, there are many countries that fear this withdrawal is creating a power void and destabilizing the area. The United States must explain the issue to all concerned. In particular, the withdrawal from South Korea is not all American forces and reflects the fact that South Korean armed forces are fully capable of defending themselves against invasion from the North, at least until the West could regroup to support them. In fact, the number of American troops stationed there today could do little to stop an invasion and would require significant reinforcements in order to contribute significantly. The other primary reason is more a matter of pride and politics for the South Korean government. As it is now, the United States is a focal point of opposition groups. By drawing down our numbers, we can show our respect for South Korea's sovereignty and ability to carry the burden of defending themselves.

Withdrawal from the Philippines must be presented as a reinforcement of the United States' respect for the integrity and sovereignty of all nations. The will of the Philippine government shall be respected but it should be pointed out to all countries that American forces are not withdrawing from the area, but that most forces are being relocated to Japan, Guam, Singapore, and other Western Pacific locations. It is important to communicate with all governments in the area that our commitment to the area is as strong today as it was yesterday. In part, it requires that the United States not lose face in the eyes of all parties. If that were to happen, our influence and access in the area would decrease and the potential for greater instability would increase. CINCPAC must use all the options available to him to insure there is no impression that the United States is or is about to abandon the region.

Currently, American presence in the form of major bases is represented in the CINCPAC AOR by our military bases in Japan, South Korea, and Diego Garcia. They are the cornerstones of our forward presence in the form of bases and help preserve the balance of power. The importance of those forward bases can not be downplayed as they provide an essential stepping stone for Navy, Marine, Air Force, and Army units to use as potential staging areas and resupply points during a crisis. The recent agreements with Singapore and Malaysia, allowing use of their repair and port facilities, strengthens our presence even as the availability of bases in the Philippines ends. Incoming

discussions with Indonesia and the government of Brunei's offer of base usage help broaden the potential for maintaining our influence and access. Forward presence is also represented by our diplomatic leadership in trying to solve critical regional conflicts such as the Cambodia civil war. This type of involvement is valued and respected by all nations. Obviously, political capitalization of these altruistic goals will reinforce our commitment to maintaining the balance of power and promoting regional stability.

## Chapter VI

### Summary and Conclusion

America's military strategy in CINCPAC's AOR is to maintain the balance of power and promote regional stability. This strategy supports the national interests and objectives of ensuring the survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, protecting our vital economic interests, ensuring vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations, and promoting a stable security region in the Western Pacific as discussed in the August 1991 National Security Strategy of the United States document.

Summary. Economically, culturally, and militarily, the United States is tied to the countries of the Pacific AOR. The United States is dependent on the strong economic ties that exist and culturally, immigrants from the Pacific AOR have greater potential to affect the policies of this country than they have had. Militarily, we have several mutual defense treaties which obligate us to remain engaged in the area. Additionally, one cannot overemphasize the military and commercial importance of the Straits of Malacca and the straits of Lombok as international maritime corridors between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Any disruption of traffic would risk military intervention by one or more major powers.

The United States has told its Asian allies that it intends to reduce its forward presence but total withdrawal of American

forces would invite instability and potential adventurism by any number of players. As a result of the failure of socialist oriented economies and the Soviet global withdrawal, the tendency for the United States is to withdraw. However, it is not practical considering our own international economic interdependence and interests. CINCPAC will need to use the forces he has in new and innovative ways in order to overcome the perception that we are creating a power vacuum. Higher visibility in as many countries as possible and the continuing reinforcement of the fact that we will remain engaged in the area because of our vital interests must be emphasized. This will ensure there is no incentive by aggressive nations to alter the balance of power and stability in the region.

We are not the only country that could provide a stabilizing force but we are the only one that doesn't present a threat to any of the region's nations. China, India, and Japan are three countries that could replace the United States but they all have historical, ethical or questionable motives when viewed by their smaller neighbors and each other.

Forward presence represents a commitment to economic well being and peace for everyone. If China, India, Japan and the other countries in the area do not respect the ability of the United States to keep the peace and it is determined that the United States is a "paper tiger", then the commitment of military, economic, and political capital will not prevent any of these countries from potentially destabilizing the area. America

has vital interest in the Pacific AOR and they will continue to grow as time passes. The potential economic market far exceeds what Europe can offer and our interests should refocus away from Europe.

Conclusion. CINCPAC has the ability to protect America's interest in the Pacific AOR for at least the next few years. For the most part, he will be able to deter aggression, maintain the balance of power, promote regional security, and protect American vital interests with what he will have available. The exception to the ability of deterring aggression is the volatility of China, India, and North Korea as their actions are unpredictable and uncontrollable when border disputes are in question.

## Notes

### Chapter II

1. A. Hasman Habib, 'Japan's Role in the Asian Pacific Region: an ASEAN Perception,' The Indonesian Quarterly, First Quarter 1990, p. 47.
2. By adding the imports and exports of the leading nations of Western Europe versus the totals for South Asia and Asia including Australia and New Zealand, the totals show that Pacific AOR countries equal 312 billion dollars and Western Europe countries equal 220 billion dollars.
3. Mark S. Hoffman, ed., The World Almanac and Book of Facts: 1992 (New York: Pharos Books), 1992, p. 672.
4. Includes the following countries: United Kingdom, West Germany, Denmark, Ireland, Netherlands, Belgium-Luxembourg, France, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece, Iceland, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Austria, Switzerland, and Turkey.
5. James K. Jackson, 'Japanese Investment in the United States,' CRS Review, August 1991, p. 34.
6. Hoffman, p. 153.
7. Mark S. Hoffman, ed., The World Almanac and Book of Facts: 1990 (New York: Pharos Books), 1990, p. 78.
8. Ibid., p. 78.
9. Mark S. Hoffman, ed., The World Almanac and Book of Facts: 1992 (New York: Pharos Books), 1992, p. 142.
10. Western Europe includes the following countries: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom, Austria, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey.
11. World Tables: 1989-90 Edition (Baltimore: The World Bank, The John Hopkins University Press), 1990, pp. 22-5.
12. Hoffman, pp. 143, 737-807.
13. Gross National Product is the market value of all goods and services that have been bought for final use during a year. The GNP is considered the most comprehensive measure of a nation's economic activity.

14. Statistical Abstract of the U.S.: 1991. (Washington: Department of Commerce, 1991), p.434.
15. There is no year for the GNP as it is a summary of figures over a three year period from 1987-1989.
16. No per capita income exists for Pacific AOR.
17. "Hong Kong-General Data and Government." Kaleidoscope: Current World Data, 9 September 1991, p. 2. (Obtained info for Hong Kong only.)
18. Felicity Barringer, "Asian Population in U.S. Grew by 70% in the 80's," The New York Times, 2 March 1990, p. A14:1-4.
19. Felicity Barringer, "Immigration Brings New Diversity to Asian Population in the U.S.," The New York Times, 12 June 1991, p. D5:2.
20. Felicity Barringer, "Census Shows Profound Change in Racial Makeup of the Nation," The New York Times, 11 March 1991, pp. A1:2, B8:2.
21. Other represents a mixture of races due to confusion of which group the individual actually falls under.
22. U.S. Bureau of the Census. Statistical Abstract of the U.S.: 1991. (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off.), 1991, p. 10.
23. Fox Butterfield, "Asians Spread Across Land, and Help Change It," The New York Times, 24 February 1991, p. A22:4.
24. The U.S.-Japan Treaty was revised in 1960 and in 1972 it became renewable each year vice a permanent treaty.
25. Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines, and Brunei are members of ASEAN.
26. International Security Council, Security Policy in East Asia: A Politico-Military Assessment: 1988 (New York: The Council: 1988), p. 66.
27. Ron Scherer, "US Military Prepares for Flexible Pacific Defense," The Christian Science Monitor, 13 May 1990, p. 6:2.
28. Joseph R. Morgan and Mark J. Valencia, eds., Atlas for Marine Policy in Southeast Asian Seas (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983), p. 93.
29. Ibid.



### Chapter III

1. William T. Tow, 'Post-Cold War Security in East Asia,' The Pacific Review, Volume 4 Number 2 1991, Oxford University Press, p. 100.
2. 'Northeast Asia, 'New Law Claims Sovereignty Over Spratly Islands,' FBIS, 27 February 1992, p. 15.
3. 'Forty-one islands are occupied by five different nations using five different basis for their claims. Additionally, Brunei, Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand have claims to the islands but do not occupy any of them.'
4. Chaiwat Khamchoo, 'Japan's Role in South East Asian Security: 'Plus ca Change...', Pacific Affairs, Spring 1991, p. 7.
5. Hasjim Djalal, 'The Major Powers and Regional Issues in Southwest Asia,' Indonesian Quarterly, First Quarter 1990, p. 70.
6. Larry A. Niksch, 'Korea: Kim Il-sung's Kingdom Under Siege,' Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter: 1992 Annual Reference Edition, December/January 1992, p. 34.
7. 'Asia/Pacific Security Backgrounder: North Still Saying No to Nuclear Safeguards ... and Making Missiles,' Pacific Research, Vol. 3 No. 3 August 1990, p. 13.
8. Interview with Cdr. David S. Pert, Royal Australian Navy, Naval Command College, Newport, RI: 1 May 1992.
9. 'The Navies of the ASEAN States,' Asian Defence Journal, September 1990, p. 46.

### Chapter IV

1. X. 'The Sources of Soviet Conduct,' Foreign Affairs, Vol. 65, No. 4, Spring 1987, p. 867.
2. John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 59.

### Chapter V

1. 'There has been talk of combining JTF Five with JTF Four and moving them to Texas or some other site.'

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